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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Accordingly, this Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(k) -- "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court.M 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue Presented for Review 
Whether the District Court properly dismissed Nielsen's personal 
injury action on the basis that Nielsen had previously brought suit 
against the Mortensens for damages arising out of the same factual 
incident? 
2. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a dismissal based on Rule 12(b)(6) 
"accept[ing] the material allegations of the complaint as true, and 
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears 
the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her 
claims." Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah App. 
1994) (citing Hansen v. Department of Fin. Inst., 858 P.2d 184, 185-86 
(Utah App. 1993)). "The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness, giving no 
particular deference to the lower court's determination." Id. (citing 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 
(Utah 1991); Hansen, 858 P.2d at 186). The fact that the trial court 
considered matters outside the pleadings is of no consequence to the 
instant appeal because, whether this court treats this as an appeal 
from an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or from 
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a Rule 5 6 summary judgment motion, this court reviews the trial 
court's decision for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of No. Am. Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
This appeal does not involve the interpretation of 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
which would be determinative of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition in the Courts Below. 
Appellant Lynn Nielsen ("Nielsen") appeals the Third District 
Court's Order granting Appellees Ronald and Del Rae Mortensen's 
("Mortensens") Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissing 
Nielsen's personal injury action with prejudice. 
On April 13, -1992, Nielsen filed a small claims action against 
the Mortensens for property damage arising out of an alleged slip and 
fall at the Mortensens' premises on April 10, 1991 (hereinafter 
"Nielsen I"). (See copy of Small Claims Affidavit; Record, page 28). 
On May 6, 1992, the Small Claims Court held a trial, heard arguments 
from both parties, and entered a judgment in favor of the Mortensens. 
(See Copy of Small Claims Judgment; Record, page 29). 
On May 13, 1992, Nielsen appealed the small claims decision to 
the Third Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court scheduled a trial de 
novo for August 28, 1992. (See copy of Notice of Appeal; Record, page 
30). The Circuit Court in Nielsen I held the trial de novo on August 
28, but Nielsen failed to appear either personally or through counsel. 
Rather, a friend of Nielsen's appeared on her behalf and requested a 
2 
continuance for Nielsen. Because Nielsen failed to demonstrate due 
diligence to appear either personally or through counsel, the Circuit 
Court entered a judgment against Nielsen, dismissing Nielsen I with 
prejudice. (See copy of Judgment and Order; Record, pages 31-32). 
Subsequently, on December 30, 1993, Nielsen, through counsel, 
filed in the Third District Court an action for personal injury 
damages arising out of the same slip and fall which occurred on 
April 10, 1991, at the Mortensens' premises (hereinafter "Nielsen 
I_I"). (See Complaint; Record, pages 2-5). In response, on January 
21, 1994, Mortensens' filed a Motion to Dismiss Nielsen's complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that the doctrine of res judicata 
barred Nielsen's claim for personal injury damages. (See Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and supporting memoranda; Record, pages 19-32, 
36-40) . 
After an initial hearing, the Honorable John A. Rokich reserved his 
ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss until a second hearing could 
be held on May 9, 1994, to determine when Nielsen first discovered 
that she was injured. (See Minute Entry; Record, page 46). 
After hearing testimony from Nielsen and considering all of the 
evidence presented at the second hearing, Judge Rokich concluded that 
Nielsen knew she had been injured at the time she filed the Nielsen I 
complaint. The judge ruled that Nielsen II was barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Consequently, Judge Rokich granted Mortensens' 
Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the Nielsen II complaint with prejudice. 
(See Minute Entry; Record, page 73; and Order; Record, pages 74-75). 
Nielsen filed a Notice of Appeal on June 20, 1994, (See Notice 
of Appeal; Record, page 76), and the Supreme Court of Utah received 
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the Notice of Appeal on October 17, 1994. Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court transferred Nielsen's appeal to this Court. 
2. Statement of Facts 
The instant appeal arises out of an alleged slip and fall which 
Nielsen claims occurred on April 10, 1991 at the residence of the 
Mortensens. 
Nielsen claims that she, as a result of the fall, injured her 
left wrist and hand, and additionally damaged some jewelry she was 
wearing at the time. (Small Claims Affidavit, Third district 
Complaint; Record, pages 28 and 2-5). 
On April 13, 1992 Nielsen filed the complaint in Nielsen I 
against the Mortensens, sounding in tort, for property damages 
resulting from the April 10, 1991 slip and fall. After the Nielsen I 
claims were dismissed with prejudice, on December 30, 1993, Nielsen, 
through counsel, filed the complaint in Nielsen II against the 
Mortensens, sounding also in tort, for personal injuries arising out 
of the same April 10, 1991 slip and fall. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the District Court's order dismissing 
the Nielsen II complaint because the claim preclusion branch of the of 
the res judicata doctrine prohibits Nielsen from splitting her 
personal injury claims from her property damage claims. Nielsen I and 
the subsequent Nielsen II meet the three requirements necessary to 
conclude that Nielsen is prohibited from splitting the two actions: 
(1) Nielsen and the Mortensens were parties to both actions; (2) 
Nielsen could have originally asserted the personal injury and 
property damage claims in the Third District Court, a court of general 
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jurisdiction, but chose not to; and (3) the Circuit Court, having 
competent jurisdiction in Nielsen I. entered a judgment by default 
which resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE NIELSEN II 
COMPLAINT BECAUSE CLAIM PRECLUSION PROHIBITS SPLITTING 
CLAIMS WHICH ARISE OUT OF THE SAME INCIDENT. 
It is axiomatic that the law disfavors the splitting of a cause 
of action and generally requires parties to include all claims which 
arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts. Indeed, the above-
stated, along with similar policies provided the genesis of the' res 
judicata doctrine. In D'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 
1992), the Court stated: 
In order for a claim to be barred by res judicata, 
both the prior claim and the current claim must meet 
three requirements: (1) both actions must involve the 
same parties, their privies, or assignees; (2) the 
claim that is asserted to be barred must have been 
presented or be such that it could have been presented 
in the first case; and (3) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 
Id. at 350. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah courts have consistently applied the res judicata doctrine to bar 
lawsuits asserting claims which could have been presented in prior 
related lawsuits. 
In Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974), a number 
of lessee dealers sued the oil company to recover for unlawful price 
discrimination in violation of Utah's Unfair Practices Act. Texaco 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the same dealers had 
previously brought an action in federal court alleging violations of 
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federal law arising out of the same alleged misconduct. The state law 
claims were never asserted in the prior federal action, however, 
Texaco claimed the dealers could have brought the state claims in the 
prior federal action had they so desired, under the doctrine of 
pendent jurisdiction. The lower court agreed and granted Texaco's 
motion for summary judgment. In affirming the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Since plaintiffs failed to assert their state claim, 
when the federal court had the power to adjudicate it 
with the federal claim, they are barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata from litigating these issues 
in the instant action. 
Id. at 382. 
The court reasoned that the doctrine of res judicata applies not only 
to points and issues which are actually raised and decided in a prior 
action, but also applies to those that could have been adjudicated, as 
long as the claims all arise out of a common nucleus of operative 
facts. As before mentioned, Utah courts have consistently adhered to 
this rule. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981), where a 
defendant was barred by res judicata from asserting an affirmative 
defense of impossibility of performance in a contract action when he 
could have asserted the defense in a prior action; D1Aston v. D'Aston, 
844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992), where a prior divorce proceeding which 
had adjudicated property disputes barred re-litigation of any of those 
issues by any of the parties to the prior action; Rinawood v. Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), where a prior 
decision on a contract dispute regarding buyers and seller barred 
seller's claim in a subsequent action on the same contract. 
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Nielsen I and Nielsen II satisfy the three requirements of the 
claim preclusion branch of the res judicata doctrine. First, there 
can be no dispute that both Nielsen I and Nielsen II involve the 
identical parties. A more detailed discussion of the second and third 
requirements is necessary. 
A. The Claims Asserted In Nielsen II Clearly Could Have Been Asserted 
In Nielsen I. 
The Mortensens have already cited in this brief the Utah cases 
regarding this issue, however, other highly persuasive authority 
exists dealing with factual circumstances almost identical to those 
presented by the instant case and is helpful in deciding the instant 
appeal. 
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24(1), states: 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action 
extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the 
rules of merger or bar, the claim extinguished 
includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to all or any part 
of the transaction or series of connected 
transactions, out of which the action arose. 
In Comment g, illustration 14 of section 24, it states in relevant 
part : 
. . . when the jurisdiction of the court is limited . 
. . the rule stated in this section as to splitting a 
claim is applicable although the first action was 
brought in a court which has no "jurisdiction to give a 
judgment for more than a designated amount. (Emphasis 
added.) 
14. In an automobile collision, A is injured and his 
car damaged as a result of the negligence of B. 
Instead of suing in a court of general jurisdiction of 
the state, A brings his action for damage to his car 
in a justice's court, which has jurisdiction in 
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actions for damages to property but has no 
jurisdiction in actions for injuries to the person. A 
judgment is rendered for A for damage to the car. A 
cannot thereafter maintain an action against B to 
recover for the iniurv to his person arising out of 
the same collision. (Emphasis added.) 
Although not citing these specific portions, this Court has 
formally adopted §24 of the Restatement. See Berrv v. Berry, 73 8 P.2d 
246, 248 n. 1 (Utah App. 1987); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
786 P.2d 1350, 1357, cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah App. 1990). 
Additionally, other jurisdictions dealing with situations almost 
identical to that presented by the instant case, have relied upon the 
res judicata doctrine and §24 in concluding that the subsequent 
personal injury action was barred due to a final judgment rendered in 
the previous property damage action. In Kirchner v. Riherd, 702 
S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1985), an injured driver brought an action in a court 
of general jurisdiction against the second driver for personal injury 
damages suffered in an automobile accident. Injured driver had 
previously filed a small claims complaint for property damage and loss 
of use of the automobile involved and obtained a judgment. At the 
trial level summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant driver, 
the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court reviewed the case. 
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Where a plaintiff, who has a claim which in its 
entirety exceeds in amount the court's 
jurisdiction, brings an action and recovers 
judgment for an amount within the court's 
jurisdiction or is denied recovery by a judgment 
on the merits, he is, by operation of the 
judgment, precluded from thereafter maintaining 
an action for the balance of his claim, even 
though the court rendering the former judgment 
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had no authority to give a judgment upon this 
balance. 
Id. at 34. 
Similarly, in Mells v. Billoos, 482 A.2d 759 (Del. Super. Ct., 
1984), a motorcyclist brought an action in the justice of the peace 
court for property damage sustained in an automobile accident and 
obtained a judgment in his favor. He then brought an action in 
Superior Court for personal injuries arising out of the same accident. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and motorcyclist 
appealed. Affirming, the Superior Court stated: 
Justices of the Peace have jurisdiction over 
actions of trespass involving damages which do 
not exceed $1,500.00. This limited jurisdiction 
does not include claims involving personal 
injuries. Thus, there is no question that 
plaintiff could not have presented his claim in 
its entirety in the prior adjudication, due to 
the limited jurisdiction of the justice of the 
peace court. 
The fact remains, however, that plaintiff was not 
compelled to bring part of his claim in the 
justice of the peace court. Rather, he 
voluntarily chose a court of limited jurisdiction 
when he could have presented all his claims, 
property damage and personal injury had he 
brought the original action in this court. 
Id. at 761. 
The opinion also contains discussion and analysis of similar decisions 
from other jurisdictions. 
In Dill v. Averv, 502 A.2d 1051 (Md. 1986), husband and wife 
brought an action against driver of other automobile for wife's 
personal injuries and both of their losses of consortium. Previously, 
husband and wife had filed an action against defendant for automobile 
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damage resulting from the same collision. The trial court granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed. 
In discussing this issue, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
recognized the vast majority of jurisdictions following the 
Restatement Rule: 
In 24 A.L.R.4th 646 (1983), a second and equally 
extensive annotation upon that issue cited cases 
in a great many jurisdictions in the course of 
which it is said in section 3 (a) that cases 
generally support the broad proposition that a 
single act which causes simultaneous injury to 
the physical person and property of one 
individual gives rise to only one cause of 
action. 
Id. at 1053. 
Nielsen cannot persuasively argue to this Court that she 
could not have brought her personal injury claims in Nielsen I 
because of the limited jurisdictional amount of the small claims 
court. At all relevant times a court of general jurisdiction was 
available to Nielsen, but she simply chose not to avail herself of 
this opportunity. Clearly, the above-cited authority shows that 
Nielsen's claims in Nielsen II could have been and should have 
been brought in Nielsen I and therefore satisfy the second 
requirement of the claim preclusion branch of the res judicata 
doctrine. 
B. Nielsen I Resulted In A Final Judgment For Purposes of Res 
Judicata. 
A judgment is final for purposes of the res judicata doctrine 
if it, "puts an end to a lawsuit declaring that the plaintiff is 
or is not entitled to recover the remedy sought." Schonev v. 
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Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993). In 
Schonev, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that a default 
judgment entered in favor of defendants in a prior lawsuit barred 
the filing of a subsequent lawsuit by the same plaintiff for 
claims arising out of the same incident. 
The instant case presents a judgment very similar to that 
dealt with in Schonev. In the instant case, Nielsen failed to 
appear at the circuit court for the scheduled trial and her claims 
were dismissed with prejudice. Nielsen's attempts to explain to 
this Court the reasons for which the default was improperly 
entered against her are irrelevant to the instant appeal. A party 
cannot raise issues for the first time on appeal. If Nielsen felt 
that the default judgment was improperly entered against her, she 
could have availed herself of post trial motions as provided by 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, but chose not to. Clearly, the 
judgment entered against Nielsen in Nielsen I was a final judgment 
for purposes of res judicata, 
Nielsen is misplaced in her assertion that an order is not 
final if, when appealed, it leads to a trial de novo. The 
authority upon which plaintiff relies is not applicable to the 
instant case. For example, Salt Lake Citv v. Piepenbura. 571 P.2d 
1299 (Utah 1977), involves a prosecution and conviction for the 
exhibition of an obscene motion picture. The language which 
plaintiff cites is found in Justice Maughan's dissenting opinion 
and is pure dictum. Plaintiff is equally misplaced in relying 
upon the case of Kirk v. Div. of Occ. & Pro. Licensing, 815 P.2d 
242 (Utah App. 1991), which involves an appeal of the order of an 
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administrative law judge and the application of the res judicata 
doctrine in that setting. Clearly, the instant appeal does not 
present this Court with such a procedural background and the case 
is inapplicable. 
In short, Nielsen has not provided this Court with any 
applicable or persuasive authority to support her position. This 
Court should conclude that the District Court properly dismissed 
Nielsen's complaint in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming all of Nielsen's allegations in the instant case to be 
true, on April 10, 1991, Nielsen slipped and fell at the Mortensens' 
residence which resulted in damages to some jewelry which Nielsen was 
wearing at the time, along with personal injuries. Thereafter, 
Nielsen filed the Nielsen I lawsuit against the Mortensens alleging 
that the Mortensens were negligent and that such negligence caused 
Nielsen to suffer property damage. After an adverse final judgment 
was rendered against Nielsen, she decided to file Nielsen II against 
the Mortensens, alleged that the Mortensens were negligent and that 
such negligence caused Nielsen to suffer personal injuries. At all 
relevant times, a court of general jurisdiction was available to 
Nielsen, in which she could have filed a tort action against the 
Mortensens and asserted all claims arising out of the April 10, 1991 
slip and fall, but for some reason she chose not to. 
Because the parties in both Nielsen I and Nielsen II are 
identical, the Nielsen II claims could or should have been asserted 
in Nielsen I, and Nielsen I resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits, Judge Rokich correctly reasoned that the claim preclusion 
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branch of the res judicata doctrine barred Nielsen's claims in 
Nielsen II and properly dismissed the complaint. 
This Court should enter an Order affirming the District Court's 
Order dismissing Nielsen's complaint against the Mortensen's with 
prejudice. , 
DATED this 12> day of April, 1995. 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Brett G. Pearce 
Attorney for Appellees Mortensens 
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